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Abstract: 
 
Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas such as e-commerce where 
protocol participants require mutual guarantees that a transaction involving exchange of items 
has taken place in a specific manner. A protocol is fair if no protocol participant can gain any 
advantage over an honest participant by misbehaving. In addition, such a protocol is fault 
tolerant if the protocol can ensure that an honest participant does not suffer any loss of fairness 
despite any failures of the participant’s node. This report presents a family of fair exchange 
protocols for two participants which make use of the presence of a trusted third party, under a 
variety of assumptions concerning participant misbehaviour, message delays and node 
reliability. The development is systematic, beginning with the strongest set of the assumptions 
and gradually weakening the assumptions to the weakest set. The resulting protocol family 
exposes the impact of a given set of assumptions on solving the problem of fair exchange. 
Specifically, it highlights the relationships that exist between fairness and assumptions on the 
nature of participant misbehaviour, communication delays and node crashes. The report also 
shows that the restrictions assumed on a dishonest participant’s misbehaviour can be realized 
through the use of smartcards and smartcard-based protocols. 
 
Keywords and Phrases:  Fair Exchange, Security, Trusted Third Party (TTP), Smartcards, Crash 
tolerance, Distributed Systems. 
 
(This Technical Report without the appendices is to appear as a regular paper in the IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing.) 
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1. Introduction 
Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas where protocol 
participants require mutual guarantees that an exchange of data items has taken place in a 
specific manner. An exchange is fair if a dishonest participant cannot gain any advantage over 
honest participants by misbehaving. Practical schemes for fair exchange require a trusted party 
that essentially plays the role of a notary in the paper based schemes. (Gradual Exchange 
protocols [BGMR90] which do not need a trusted party have high communication overhead.) 
Two-participant fair-exchange protocols that make use of a trusted third party have been studied 
in the literature (e.g., [ZG96, ASW97, FR97, BDM98]); these protocols maintain fairness even if 
the dishonest participant can tamper with the protocol execution in an unrestricted (malicious) 
manner. They however require that an honest participant’s node execute the protocol correctly – 
suffering no failures. In other words, fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols have not been studied 
adequately. A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an honest 
participant even if the participant’s node experiences failures of the assumed type. 
In this report we develop a number of fair exchange protocols under a variety of assumptions 
concerning user misbehaviour, communication delays and node failures. Our development is 
systematic: we begin by classifying dishonest participants into restricted abusers (they cannot 
tamper with the protocol execution in an arbitrary manner) and unrestricted or malicious abusers, 
and the communication model into synchronous, where a known bound on message delays exists, 
and asynchronous; we develop the very first protocol under the most constrained set of 
assumptions: restricted abuser, synchronous communication and no fault tolerance. We then 
relax the restricted abuser assumption to malicious abuser and then the synchrony assumption 
into asynchrony. The resulting family of non-fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols is then 
transformed into a family of crash-tolerant protocols.  
A major contribution of this report is to highlight the relationships that exist between fairness 
and the assumptions concerning abuse restriction, communication delays, and node reliability. 
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This enables a reader to gain a deeper understanding of the impact that a given set of assumptions 
has on solving the fair-exchange problem. Such an understanding simplifies deriving a protocol 
for one set of assumptions from those developed with different sets of assumptions. This paper is 
a revised and extended version of [ES04] which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only paper 
that comprehensively studied the relationships between such diverse combinations of 
assumptions and the fair-exchange protocols. The second significant contribution is the 
development of a restricted abuse model and a realization of that model by making use of the 
smartcard technology.  
Several useful observations are made by comparing our protocols with the related ones in the 
literature. For example, we note that the use of optimistic message logging for crash tolerance is 
more subtle than that suggested in [LNJ00] - the first paper to consider fair-exchange with fault-
tolerance. Further, contract-signing protocols are observed to transform easily into fair-exchange 
protocols under our restricted abuse model. This means that many contract-signing protocols 
presented in the literature (e.g., [ASW98, GJM99]) can be used to derive fair-exchange protocols 
for different sets of assumptions. These observations constitute the third and final contribution.  
The report is organised as follows. We first describe the problem of fair-exchange in detail 
and the underlying system models (section 2), and then develop a family of non-fault-tolerant 
protocols (section 3), followed by their crash-tolerant counterparts (section 4). In section 5, we 
describe the use of smartcards in realizing the restricted abuser model defined in section 2. 
Section 6 surveys the literature for related and similar work and section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. System Models and the Problem Description  
We consider two mutually untrusting users, UA and UB, who have data items IA and IB 
respectively which the other user cannot generate autonomously. User Ux, X ∈{A, B}, advertises 
that IX meets specification ΣX and offers to send Ix in return for receiving IY, where Y ∈{A, B} 
and Y ≠ X. Px denotes the process that executes an exchange protocol on behalf of user Ux on 
node Nx. Our distributed exchange system (Figure 1) has a third node hosting the trusted third 
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party (TTP) process. The TTP is assumed to be reliable and secure against intrusions and Trojan 
horse attacks, and is also trusted by both the users. The exchange preserves fairness as well as 
non-repudiation. (These properties will be precisely defined shortly.)  
 
NA 
TTP 
PA 
NB 
PB 
UA 
Communication 
subsystem 
UB 
 
Figure 1. The 2-user Fair-Exchange System. 
2.1. Classifying User Misbehaviour 
Generally, the problem of fair exchange is solved in a context where a dishonest user Ux 
totally controls the behaviour of PX to undermine every attempt to ensure fairness and non-
repudiation. We term those dishonest users as malicious abusers and distinguish such users from 
a class of restricted abusers defined below.  
Restricted Abuser:  
A dishonest user UX is a restricted abuser if  
i. PX can execute a piece of code ΠX which will remain obfuscated to UX before, during 
and after the execution; 
ii. UX can interfere with an execution of ΠX only by crashing the execution platform or 
by delaying, blocking, or tampering with any message which the execution of ΠX 
outputs or is destined to receive. 
Suppose, for example, that user UB is a restricted abuser and ΠB contains some secret 
encryption keys and some input-verification procedures. By the definition above, UB cannot 
obtain the encryption keys in ΠB at any time (due to (i)), nor can a modification of ΠB by UB 
result in an incorrect input data being verified to be correct (due to (ii)). 
- 5 - 
We note that code obfuscation, used in software watermarking and tamper-proofing (see 
[CT00] for a survey), cannot be guaranteed to be totally secure [BGI01]: there exists a non-zero 
probability that an obfuscated program ceases to be a virtual black box to an abuser. Therefore, 
realising the restricted-abuse model requires that PX receive ΠX from the TTP via a secure 
channel and have it executed in a tamper-proof execution platform. In section 5, we describe how 
smartcards can be used to meet these requirements. We also observe here that there is much 
interest in developing tamper-proof computing subsystems by the industry led Trusted 
Computing Group [TCG05]. So, it is of practical interest to develop fair-exchange protocols 
under the restricted abuse model and to expose thereby any benefits which the model has to offer. 
2.2. Classifying Communication Delays 
Inter-process communication is assumed to be resilient to network failures and intrusions. 
This in turn assumes that any message corruption is detected using encryption and reduced to a 
message loss, and that message losses are tolerated by a bounded number of retransmissions.  
Note that a network intruder is here assumed to be a restricted abuser: a message in transit is 
a black box to him; he cannot modify it and have it undetected at the destination. He can at best 
block a given transmission or prevent it from being accepted at the destination. We consider two 
types of network intrusions: intruder gives up delaying a given message transmission after a 
known period of time or after some unknown time, leading to two models: in the synchronous 
model, correct processes exchange messages with delays bounded by a known D; in the 
asynchronous model, D is unknown (but finite). 
2.3. Classifying Node Behaviour 
A fair-exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures fairness and non-repudiation to an 
honest participant despite the possibility that the participant’s node can suffer failures of the 
assumed type. In other words, guarantees afforded to an honest user do not change when his node 
is unreliable. We consider two types of behaviour for user nodes: 
Reliable: An honest user’s node does not fail. 
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Crash-recovery: An honest user’s node fails by stopping to function (crash); it recovers 
within some finite (but unknown) amount of time after a crash and may crash again after some 
unknown amount of time following its recovery; and, this may get repeated for ever. An honest 
user’s node has access to a stable store whose contents survive the node crash. 
The traditional view taken in the TTP-based protocols (e.g., [ZG96, ASW97, ASW98, 
PSW98, BDM98]) is that the user nodes are reliable; the cause of any node crash is attributed to 
the user who is seen to have misbehaved and is therefore not entitled to any fair-exchange 
guarantee. We classify such protocols as non fault-tolerant (see also [LNJ00]). Note that whether 
the protocol is crash-tolerant or not, the TTP is (assumed to be) reliable and secure.  
2.4. Properties of a fair exchange Protocol  
A user is honest if he makes no attempt to modify the behaviour of a protocol process except 
through the permitted operations. 
Termination: An execution of the protocol terminates for an honest user UX. Termination for 
an honest UX can be either  
• a normal termination in which PX delivers IY to UX and the delivered IY meets ΣY, or 
• an exceptional termination where PX informs UX that the exchange attempt is 
unsuccessful. 
Fairness: If PX of honest UX terminates normally and if UY is honest, UY also terminates 
normally. If PX of honest UX terminates exceptionally, UY – honest or not – cannot receive IX. 
When both the users are honest, both are guaranteed to have the same type of termination. 
(This property is referred to as the goods atomicity in [T97].) If only one user is honest and if he 
has exceptional termination, then the dishonest user cannot receive the expected item.  
Non-repudiation: When PX delivers IY to honest UX, it also provides irrefutable evidence that 
IY was sent by UY. 
Non-Triviality: When both UA and UB are honest, they are guaranteed to have normal 
termination, provided that certain specified conditions hold. 
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Without non-triviality, the other properties are trivially met if PA and PB always terminate 
exceptionally. Since non-triviality is defined only when both the users are honest, guaranteeing it 
cannot be directly affected by the abuse model considered, but only by the assumptions chosen 
regarding the other two aspects. It turns out that when the communication is synchronous and the 
nodes are reliable, non-triviality is unconditionally guaranteed; for all other combinations of 
assumptions, as we explain below, some specific sets of conditions need to be satisfied.  
In the crash-recovery model, the bound on the time taken by an honest user node to recover 
from a crash is unknown and a dishonest user may never allow his node to recover. Consider an 
honest user or the TTP that is waiting too long for a message from a user process. It cannot 
resolve whether the source process is honest and the message is delayed due to a crash or is 
dishonest and is never going to transmit the expected message. Similarly, in the asynchronous 
model, it cannot resolve whether the user process from whom a message is expected is honest 
and its message is still in transit or is dishonest and the message will not be transmitted at all. 
(Similar arguments give rise to the well-known FLP impossibility result [FLP85].)  Therefore, 
meeting the termination property would mean that a protocol execution may have to be 
terminated exceptionally even if both the users are honest. So, the necessary condition for non-
triviality is that the honest users re-execute the protocol after every exceptional termination. If 
each execution is termed as an attempt, an honest user must be prepared to make as many 
attempts as necessary until he has normal termination. 
The sufficient condition for non-triviality varies with the chosen combination of assumptions: 
there must be an exchange attempt in which 
(i) user nodes do not crash, for the combination of synchronous communication and crash-
recovery nodes; 
(ii) message delays do not increase during the protocol execution, for the combination of 
asynchronous communication and reliable nodes; and, 
(i) and (ii), for the combination of asynchronous communication and crash-recovery nodes.  
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2.5. Assumptions, Notations and the Exchange Preliminaries  
In all our protocols, the TTP sets up the context and initiates the exchange. Consequently, the 
protocols are structured into two phases: start-up phase (nearly common to all protocols) and 
exchange phase (specific to the selected combination of assumptions). It is assumed that: 
 A1: Processing within functioning nodes is synchronous. Delays for task scheduling and 
processing are bounded by a known constant, which, for simplicity, is taken to be zero in relation 
to communication delays; when a protocol instruction involves computationally intensive 
operations (e.g., taking a checkpoint), the execution delay is assumed to be counted in the 
communication delay estimates. 
A2: Clocks of functioning nodes are perfectly synchronised. The clocks of the TTP and 
the functioning nodes of honest users are synchronised to real-time within a known bound which, 
for simplicity, is assumed to be zero. A recovering node receives the current time from its user. 
2.5.1. Notations  
The following notations are frequently used in the paper.  
VA: procedure to verify whether IA satisfies its description ΣA advertised by UA. Similarly, VB 
is the procedure to verify whether IB satisfies its description ΣB advertised by UB. 
M: a message; eK(M): encryption of M using key K. 
SigX(M): signature of PX, X ∈{A, B}, on M using the private key of UX; SigTTP(M): TTP’s 
signature on M. Signatures are both signer- and content-dependent, and are verifiable using the 
signer’s public key. 
L: a label that uniquely identifies the exchanging of IA and IB. 
N: a large random number (nonce) generated securely by the TTP to uniquely identify 
messages of a given attempt.  
H: one-way and collision- resistant hash function: it is not feasible to compute from H(N), N 
nor another N’ such that H(N) = H(N’). H(N) is smaller in size compared to N, and is therefore 
used in place of N when the latter needs to be included in a message. 
Πx: contents of a message sent by the TTP to Px to initiate the exchange phase. 
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When a party Z ∈{A, B, TTP} sends a message M it also includes SigZ(M) as the evidence of 
origin for M. A recipient accepts a received M only if the accompanying SigZ(M) is found 
authentic and if the contents of M have been formed as per the protocol-specific conditions. 
While the latter will be stated clearly, the verification details are not made explicit in our 
presentations for reasons of brevity. Thus a received message will refer, from now on, only to a 
message received with an authentic evidence of origin and with appropriate contents, not to the 
one that was received and found inappropriate or not authentic. Further the pair {M, SigZ(M)} is 
simply written as M which will be indicated by its significant fields. Finally, sending of a 
message M, say, by PA to PB, will be denoted as: PA → PB: M. 
2.5.2. Exchange Preliminaries – the start-up phase 
The start-up phase has two sub-phases, each containing two steps. 
Step 0.1: Users decide between themselves the relinquish time TR. This is the time by which 
they hope to complete the exchange and the TTP is instructed not to keep the exchange-related 
state information after TR. They inform the TTP of TR and, in return, obtain label L and SigTTP(A, 
B, L, TR) from the TTP. Using the → notation, Step 0.1 can be expressed as: 
 
 TTP → UA : {A, B, L, TR}; TTP → UB: {A, B, L, TR};  
Step 0.2: Each UX approaches a trusted authority TAX to generate a verification procedure 
using which any party can verify if IX satisfies the advertised specification ΣX. For example, if IB 
is a piece of software S, TAB is a software licensing authority (trusted by UA) who evaluates S 
against the specification ΣB. If satisfied, TAB computes an evidence of evaluation EB = H(S); VB 
is then generated as a program which contains EB and evaluates the predicate EB = H(I) when 
invoked to verify a data item I. Similarly, if IA is an electronic cheque, VA should similarly be 
generated by a Bank for the amount specified in ΣA. Thus, the step involves: 
 
UA → TAA: (IA, ΣA, A, B, L, TR, TTP, 
SigTTP(A, B, L, TR));  
TAA → UA: {VA, ΣA, TTP, L, TR};  
UB → TAB: (IB, ΣB, A, B, L, TR, TTP, 
SigTTP(A, B, L, TR)); 
TAB → UB: {VB, ΣB, TTP, L, TR};  
Remarks. TAA and TAB also retain the information they receive until time TR. Note that 
there is no implication that TAA and TAB be the same as the TTP itself. Imposing such a 
requirement would mean that the functionality of the TTP be quite diverse.   
Steps 0.1 and 0.2 need to be re-executed for a new, agreed value for TR, if all exchange 
attempts made before TR terminate exceptionally and if users still want to continue trying.  They 
need not be executed during the second and subsequent exchange attempts before a given TR.  
Every exchange attempt involves executing steps 1.1 and 1.2 described below. 
Step 1.1: Users first decide between themselves on a (future) time TEX for the TTP to initiate 
the exchange phase. They then exchange what they received from their respective TA and TEX: 
 
UA → UB: {VA, ΣA, TTP, L, SigTA_A(VA, ΣA, 
TTP, L, TR), TEX};  
UB → UA: {VB, ΣB, TTP, L, SigTA_B(VB, ΣB, 
TTP, L, TR), TEX };  
 
Step 1.2: Users inform the TTP to initiate an exchange attempt at TEX: 
 
 UA → TTP: {L, A, B, TEX, {VA, ΣA}, {VB, 
ΣB}, rttAB}; 
UB → TTP: {L, A, B, TEX, {VA, ΣA}, {VB, 
ΣB}, rttBA};  
The last field rttXY is UX’s estimation of the round trip time between its node and NY. Upon 
receiving the messages sent in step 1.2, the TTP verifies whether all fields except the last one are 
identical, L refers to an exchange between A and B, and TEX is future and also ‘sufficiently’ 
ahead of TR. (The minimum expected value for (TR - TEX) varies with the protocols.) 
If the verifications are affirmative, the TTP generates a nonce N for the exchange attempt. It 
then sends ΠA to NA and ΠB to NB which include the parameters L and H(N). The nature and the 
complete contents of Π’s sent by the TTP will vary with the combination of chosen assumptions 
and will be described as a part of the protocol descriptions. 
2.5.3. TTP Involvement 
A protocol is said to keep the TTP off-line [BDM98] if it is possible for honest user processes 
to achieve normal termination without interacting with the TTP after an exchange attempt has 
been initiated. Such a protocol is also called optimistic in the literature (e.g., [ASW98]). If the 
TTP is not off-line, it is said to be on-line.  
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We will say that a protocol uses a state-relinquishing TTP if it allows the users to specify 
some finite value for (the relinquish time) TR in the start-up phase (Step 0.1). As in [PSW98], a 
protocol is said to use a state-keeping TTP if it does not allow a finite value to be specified for TR 
in the start-up phase; it may require the TTP to respond to messages from user processes for an 
unspecified amount of time and hence TR is expected to be set to ∞ in Step 0.1. From the cost 
point of view, the TTP is preferred to be off-line and state-relinquishing. 
2.5.4. Protocol Naming Notations 
Before presenting the protocol family, the following conventions are used for denoting each 
protocol. PR is the short form for protocol which by default is non-fault-tolerant; CT is indicative 
of a crash-tolerant protocol. The assumptions regarding abuse model (α) and communication 
model (χ) are indicated by the first and the second suffix after PR, respectively; i.e., as PR_αχ or 
CT_αχ.  
• α = R or α = M indicates that the abuse is restricted or malicious respectively.   
• χ = S or χ = A means that the communication is synchronous or asynchronous, 
respectively.  
For example, PR_RS denotes a non-fault-tolerant protocol for restricted abuser and 
synchronous communication, and CT_MA a crash-tolerant protocol for malicious abuser and 
asynchronous communication. When there are several protocols for a given set of assumptions, 
they are numbered as PR_αχ _#1, PR_αχ _#2 and so on.  
3. Non-Fault-Tolerant Protocols 
3.1. Protocol (ΡR_RS) for Restricted Abuser and Synchronous Communication  
The TTP sends code ΠA to PA and ΠB to PB. PA and PB perform the exchange phase of the 
protocol PR_RS by executing the code given to them. Embedded in ΠX are L, H(N), VX, ∆, and 
keys KA and KB, each with the TTP’s evidence of origin. ∆ is set to D (the known bound on 
message delays – see Section 2.2). KA and KB are symmetric and random session keys. Recall 
that when a dishonest UX is only a restricted abuser, he cannot obtain KA and KB from ΠX nor 
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undetectably modify VX embedded within ΠX. However, UX can delay, block, inspect, or tamper 
with any message PX generates or is destined to receive while it executes ΠX. 
The message exchange between PA and PB are depicted in Figure 2, where message shown 
along an out-going arrow is sent only on the condition that every incoming message shown has 
been received. More precisely, PX starts the rounds only after receiving ΠX (from the TTP) and a 
valid IX (from UX); it sends MX (in round 1), and sends AckX(Y) (in round 2) if MY is 
additionally received.  
Table 1 summarises the messages sent, together with their destinations. A message is 
indicated by its significant fields, with the first three fields being the label L, the sender, and 
H(N). The detailed description of the protocol for PA is presented below, and that for PB can be 
obtained by symmetry. 
  
IBΠB
PBPA
MB
PBPA
MA
PBPA Ack A(B) PBAck B(A)PA
MB
MA
IA
ΠA
Round 1
Round 2
IA
ΠA IBΠB
 
Figure 2. Protocol PR_RS: Message exchange rounds between user processes. 
On receiving ΠA, PA sets a timeout for 2∆  and verifies whether IA (input by UA) passes VA 
embedded within ΠA. If IA does not pass the verification, PA halts the execution. If IA is verified 
to be valid, PA encrypts IA using KA and the encrypted item is denoted as ΦΑ. It then forms a 
message MA whose contents include ΦΑ and are encrypted with KB. (See rows 1 and 2 of Table 
1.) MA is sent to PB. Similarly, MB is sent by PB to PA.  
If PA receives MB before the timeout (of 2∆) expires, it decrypts the received MB using KΑ, 
and then decrypts the contained ΦΒ with KΒ to obtain IB. Recall that PA is in possession of VB 
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(see Step 1.1), and can therefore verify whether IB satisfies VB. If IB is found valid, PA sends an 
acknowledgement AckA(B) to PB and waits to receive AckB(A) from PB before the timeout 
expires. Note that PA receiving MB does not lead to resetting of the timeout; it sets the timeout 
only once and completes both the rounds when or before that timeout expires. 
When PA completes both the rounds, it is in one of the four following states: SA(1,1) where it 
has received both MB and AckB(A), SA(0,0) where it has received neither, SA(1,0) where it has 
received MB not AckB(A), and SA(0,1) where it has received only AckB(A).  If PA is in state 
SA(1,1), it computes IB from MB – which is feasible as it has both the keys KA and KB. If it is in 
SA(1,0), it asks the TTP to resolve the exchange by sending message ResA that contains both MA 
and MB. (See row 4 of Table 1.) If the state is SA(0,1) or SA(0,0), PA requests the TTP to abort 
the exchange by sending message ReqA that contains MA. (See also row 5 of Table 1.) 
 
Νο. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to  PB 
1 ΦA = eKA(IA) ΦB = eKB(IB) 
2 MA =  eKB(L, A,  H(N), ΦA); PA → 
PB 
MB =  eKA(L, B,  H(N), ΦB); PB → 
PA 
3 AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), 
My_ack); PA → PB 
AckB(A) = (L, B, H(N), H(MA), 
My_ack); PB → PA 
4 ResA = (L, A, H(N), MA, MB, 
Resolve_request); PA → TTP 
ResB = (L, B, H(N), MB, MA, 
Resolve_request); PB → TTP 
5 ReqA = (L, A, H(N), MA, 
Abort_request); PA → TTP 
ReqB =  (L, B, H(N), MB, 
Abort_request); PB → TTP 
6 MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), MB, 
My_ack); TTP  → PA  
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), MA, 
My_ack); TTP  →  PB  
7 AbortTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
Abort_granted, A); TTP  → PA  
AbortTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
Abort_granted, B); TTP  →  PB  
Table 1. Description of messages used in the exchange phase of Protocol PR_RS. 
TR specified in Step 0.1 can be finite and the TTP initiates the exchange at its clock time TEX 
only if TR - TEX > 4∆. If the exchange has been initiated at TEX, the TTP initialises the variable 
outcome = unknown and executes the following three steps at TEX + 4∆.  
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Step T1: if the TTP has received Req from both PA and PB, or Res from at least one 
process, it sets outcome = resolved and resolves the exchange by sending to both the processes a 
message MTTP(X) whose contents can be seen in the row 6 of Table 1.  
Step T2: if the TTP has received Req from only one process, it sets outcome = aborted and 
aborts the exchange:  an abort token AbortTTP(X) is sent to both PA and PB. Row 7 of Table 1 
shows the contents of AbortTTP(X). 
Step T3:  The TTP terminates the execution for this exchange attempt. 
An honest PA terminates normally by receiving either MB and AckB(A) or MTTP(A); 
exceptionally by receiving AbortTTP(A). Appendix A1 presents the pseudo-code and argues that 
the four properties of fair-exchange (Section 2.4) are met based on the following observations:  
• A dishonest user, say UB, is a restricted abuser. He cannot therefore obtain KA or KB from 
ΠB. Also, he cannot deceive PB into accepting an IB for which VB(IB) is not true, nor can he 
force PB to deliver IA against the protocol conditions.  
• An honest PA sends AckA(B) to PB only if it receives MB in a timely manner. So, if UB 
obtains IA, then PA must be able to send the request ResA (containing MB) to the TTP. 
• Since PA completes both the rounds on a timeout of 2∆, the TTP will receive any message 
from PA before TEX+4∆ as per its clock. The TTP’s response is identical to both PX. 
Remarks. Post-Exchange Allegations. When PX terminates normally, the IY which UX 
receives must meet ΣY advertised by UY. This is because if UY is dishonest, he cannot deceive PY 
into accepting an IY for which VY(IY) is not true. So, if a user alleges that the item he received 
does not conform to the advertised specification, the allegation is unfounded and warrants no 
investigation from the protocol’s perspective. 
Distinct Keys. Observe that the TTP supplies the key pair, KA and KB, to both PA and PB. A 
dishonest user cannot deduce any of the keys from the TTP-supplied code ΠX. So, there is no 
reason why these keys need to be distinct, and a single key, K ≡ KA ≡ KB, can be used in their 
place: both PA and PB use K to generate ΦX and encrypt MX (see rows 1 and 2 of Table 1). We 
used distinct keys only to simplify the derivation of other protocols from PR_RS.  
- 15 - 
3.2. Malicious Abuser, Synchronous Communication (PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2) 
Derived from PR_RS are two protocols denoted as PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2. In 
PR_MS_#1, UX may receive an item that does not conform to the specification ΣY advertised by 
UY. Consequently, following a ‘normal’ termination, UX may need to contact the TTP to resolve 
a dispute. The TTP restores fairness to an honest user by contacting only the trusted authorities 
TAA and TAB; specifically, it requires no cooperation from the other user. PR_MS_#2, on the 
other hand, leaves no room for post-exchange disputes to arise.  
3.2.1 Protocol PR_MS_#1 (With Post-Exchange Dispute Resolution) 
The time taken to resolve a dispute is assumed to be bounded by a known constant DR. Since 
the communication model is synchronous, such an assumption is justified provided that dispute 
resolution terminates, i.e., does not involve dishonest users or crash-prone nodes.   
The TTP initiates an exchange only if TEX + 6∆ + DR < TR. The exchange phase of 
PR_MS_#1 is derived from PR_RS, accounting for the fact that a dishonest user, say UB, can 
now obtain the keys KA and KB from ΠB supplied by the TTP. The following four changes are 
needed in the contents of messages used, and Table 2 presents the full list of the messages: 
1. ΠA is a message containing all parameters as in PR_RS except VA and KB: ΠA = (L, 
H(N), ∆, KA); similarly,  ΠB = (L, H(N), ∆, KB). Further, the TTP should not have 
used KA and KB before.  
2. Since ΠA does not contain KB, MA is no longer encrypted with KB as in PR_RS (see 
row 2 of Table 1). The plain contents of MA and MB are shown in row 2 of Table 2.  
3. PA includes KA in AckA(B) (in place of My_ack) so that if PB has both MB and 
AckA(B) it can terminate normally without having to contact the TTP. Row 3 of Table 
2 shows the modified contents of AckA(B) and AckB(A).   
4. Finally, MTTP(A), by which the TTP instructs PA to resolve the exchange, now has KB 
(again in place of My_ack). Row 6 of Table 2 shows the contents of MTTP(X). 
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Νο. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 ΦA = eKA(IA)           ΦB = eKB(IB)            
2 MA =  (L, A,  H(N), ΦA); PA → 
PB  
MB =  (L, B,  H(N), ΦB); PB → 
PA    
3 AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), 
KA); PA → PB  
AckB(A) = (L, B, H(N), H(MA), 
KB); PB → PA  
4 ResA = (L, A, H(N), MA, MB, 
Resolve_request); PA → TTP  
ResB = (L, B, H(N), MB, MA, 
Resolve_request); PB → TTP  
5 ReqA = (L, A, H(N), MA, 
Abort_request); PA → TTP  
ReqB =  (L, B, H(N), MB, 
Abort_request); PB → TTP  
6 MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), MB, 
KB); TTP → PA    
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), MA, 
KA); TTP  →  PB  
7 AbortTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
Abort_granted, A); TTP  → PA   
AbortTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
Abort_granted, B); TTP  →  PB   
Table 2. Description of messages used in the exchange phase of Protocol PR_MS_#1. 
Correctness: Regarding termination, the arguments for PR_RS hold only if both the users 
are honest. If UB is dishonest and if PA terminates ‘normally’, UA might find the item it received 
not passing the verification test VB which it agreed with UB in the start-up phase. Consider the 
following scenario. Malicious UB obtains KB from ΠB, generates M’B using I’B ≠ IB, and 
transmits M’B in place of MB. Say, M’B is received with authentic evidence of origin. So, PA 
accepts the received M’B. Since ΠA does not contain KB (see modification 1 above), PA cannot 
check whether the I’B in the received M’B meets VB at the end of the first round itself (see figure 
2). Since PA accepts M’B, it will send AckA(B) that contains KA, thus letting PB terminate 
normally without ever contacting the TTP. Only after being delivered of I’B, UA can find out that 
I’B does not pass VB and that UB has been dishonest. Note that if UB is a restricted abuser, the 
above scenario cannot arise, as UB cannot obtain KB from ΠB.  
In summary, the exchange phase of PR_MS_#1 only guarantees that PA delivers to an honest 
UA what a dishonest UB actually sent in exchange for IA, not necessarily what UB has pledged to 
send. If the former is different from the latter, the TTP restores fairness to UA by obtaining IB 
from the trusted agent TAB whom UB employed to generate VB. This arrangement corresponds to 
a weaker form of fairness enforcement in the hierarchy of [VPG99]: fairness is guaranteed with 
the help of a trusted authority and without any cooperation from UB. 
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Dispute Resolution. When PX delivers I to UX, UX verifies whether VY(I) is true; if VY(I) is 
not true, then UX sends a dispute resolution call to the TTP with the evidence that PY sent MY 
containing the disputed I. The TTP responds to a dispute resolution call from UX by verifying the 
evidence supplied, contacting TAY to obtain IY, and forwarding IY to UX. The step T3 of sub-
section 3.1 is modified as below: 
Step T3: the TTP terminates execution at TEX + 6∆, only if no call for dispute resolution is 
received. If a call is received, it initiates the procedure for dispute resolution.  
The arguments for non-triviality remain the same as for PR_RS since they concern only when 
both users are honest. Since dispute resolution restores fairness, the definition of normal 
termination (in sub-section 2.4) can be weakened to one of UX receiving an item that either 
conforms to or can be made to conform to the advertised ΣY. This means that the arguments of 
PR_RS for fairness also hold here; the arguments for non-Repudiation are also the same as for 
PR_RS, except that the evidence of origin for KB may come from PB (in AckB(A)) as well. 
3.2.2. Protocol PR_MS_#2 (No Post-Exchange Dispute) 
The core idea behind eliminating the need to handle any post-exchange dispute is to enable 
PX to verify an encrypted item without decrypting it. We achieve this, as in the protocols of 
[RR00] and [RRN00], by making use of inverse and compatible keys and modifying PR_RS 
appropriately. The modification is simple and preserves the 2-round structure. The protocol of 
[RRN00] keeps the TTP on-line and that of [RR00], like PR_MS_#2, keeps the TTP off-line but 
requires 4 rounds when both the users are honest.  
Inverse and Compatible Keys. 
The inverse key pair {K, K-1} has this property: for any m, eK-1(eK(m)) = eK(eK-1(m)) = m. 
If keys K1 and K2 are compatible, then a product key K1×K2 can be obtained with the 
following properties:  
1. There exist two large numbers N1 and N2 such that:           
 eK1×K2(m)  ≡ eK1(µ) mod N1 if and only if m = µ; and,        
 eK1×K2(m)  ≡ eK2(µ) mod N2 if and only if m = µ; 
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2. m can be obtained from eK1×K2(m)  using K1-1 or K2-1 if N1 and N2 are known. 
As in [RRN00], N1 and N2 are assumed to be publicly known. We refer the reader to 
[RRN00] for a detailed treatment on inverse and compatible keys. Below, we state the 
modifications on PR_RS to derive PR_MS_#2. 
Step 0.1: In this step, UA and UB additionally (see also sub-section 2.5.2) obtain keys K0A and 
K0B respectively from the TTP which escrows the inverse keys K-10A and K-10B. 
Step 0.2: UA approaches its TAA also with K0A; TAA computes VA = eK0A(IA) and returns its 
response as in sub-section 2.5.2; similarly, TAB computes VB = eK0B(IB). 
The modifications on PR_RS for PA are as follows, and those for PB can be derived by 
substituting the subscripts A and B by B and A respectively. 
• PA does not receive KA from the TTP but generates it to be compatible with K0A. 
• ΦA = eK0A×KA(IA). MA = (L, A, H(N), ΦA). (See rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.) 
• By the properties of compatible keys, PA verifies if ΦB (contained in MB) and VB 
(obtained in the set-up phase) are encryptions of the same data item. If so, it sends 
AckA(B) after including K-1A in place of My_ack – see row 3 in Table 3. 
• As soon as PA computes IB after receiving both MB and AckB(A), it verifies whether IB 
satisfies ΣB. If PB has not included the correct K-1B in its AckB(A), IB will not satisfy ΣB. 
In that case, PA assumes that it did not receive AckB(A) and, as in PR_RS, it sends ResA 
to the TTP. 
• The TTP includes K-10B in place of My_ack in its MTTP(A). (See row 4 of Table 3.) 
 
No. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 ΦA = eK0A×KA(IA)   // PA generates 
KA to be compatible with K0A 
ΦB = eK0B×KB(IB)       // PB generates 
KB to be compatible with K0B     
2 MA =  (L, A,  H(N), ΦA); PA → PB  MB =  (L, B,  H(N), ΦB); PB → PA    
3 AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), K-1A); 
PA → PB               
AckB(A)= (L, B, H(N), H(MA), K-1B); 
PB → PA  
4 MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), MB, K-10B); 
TTP  → PA         
MTTP(B)= (L, TTP, H(N), MA, K-10A); 
TTP  →  PB    
Table 3. Messages of Protocol PR_RS which get modified for Protocol PR_MS_#2. 
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3.3. Restricted and Malicious Abusers, Asynchronous Communication (PR_RA and 
PR_MA) 
PR_RS, PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2 use an off-line and state-relinquishing TTP. As per 
[PSW98], the nature of the TTP makes them inappropriate for the asynchronous model for the 
following reasons (see also Section 6). In an exchange attempt, an off-line TTP may or may not 
receive an abort/resolve request from user(s); it will receive no request if users manage to have 
normal termination without contacting it. When the communication is asynchronous, the TTP 
cannot know how long a user request, if there is one, will take to arrive. So, the TTP needs to 
keep the states until it has received a request or it has known that there is no request from the 
users. The latter is possible only if each user informs the TTP of its normal termination. Since a 
dishonest user need not inform the TTP and an honest user’s message can take an arbitrary 
amount of time, a finite value for TR cannot be guaranteed in the start-up phase.  
A (contract-signing) protocol with an off-line and state-keeping TTP is presented in 
[PSW98]. We here derive PR_RA and PR_MA_#2 with an on-line and state-relinquishing TTP 
and PR_MA_#1 with an on-line and state-keeping TTP. The derivation is from their respective 
synchronous counterparts, and involves the following three modifications:  
• In Step 1.2, the TTP obtains round trip time (rtt) measurements from each PX (as rttA 
and rttB) and estimates 2∆ = maximum{2∆, rttA, rttB, rttAB, rttBA}. (Note that ∆ is 
included in the ΠX sent by the TTP to signal the start of the exchange phase.) 
• Round 1 of the exchange phase remains the same; in round 2 (see Figure 2), PX sends 
AckX(Y) to the TTP, not to PY, if it is satisfied with the round 1 message it received; it 
then waits for either MTTP(X) or AbortTTP(X) from the TTP 
• TR = ∞ only for PR_MA_#1 as it is not possible to estimate the bound DR.  
TTP: 
  when (clock = TEX) do { 
send ΠA to PA; send ΠB to PB; Set_of_M M_BagL = { }; 
repeat {receive(M); deposit M in M_BagL;} until clock < TEX+ 4∆; 
 if  (AckA(B)∈ M_BagL and AckB(A) ∈ M_BagL)  
  then {send MTTP(A) to PA; send MTTP(B) to PB;} // exchange resolved 
  else {send AbortTTP(A) to PA; send AbortTTP(B) to PB;}} /* end do 
Figure 3. Pseudo-code for the TTP in PR_RSA, PR_MA_#1 and PR_MA_#2. 
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The TTP’s code for the exchange phase is presented in Figure 3. Note that the TTP resolves 
the exchange only if both the processes are satisfied with what they received in the first round; 
also, AckX(Y) acts as a signal to the TTP that PX is satisfied with the round-1 message it 
received. MTTP(X) contains appropriate information needed for processes to decrypt the round-1 
message. This information is ‘My_ack’, KY, and K-10Y for PR_RA, PR_MA_#1 and PR_MA_#2, 
respectively – exactly as in PR_RS, PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2 respectively.  The contents of 
MTTP(X) are shown below for each protocol. (The messages ResA, ReqA, ResB and ReqB of the 
synchronous protocols are not needed.) 
MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MB), My_ack); 
TTP  → PA                      // PR_RA 
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MA), My_ack); 
TTP  →  PB                    // PR_RA 
MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MB), KB); TTP  
→ PA                          // PR_MA_#1 
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MA), KA); TTP  
→  PB                       // PR_MA_#1 
MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MB), K-10B); 
TTP  → PA                    // PR_MA_#2 
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(MA), K-10A); 
TTP  →  PB                    // PR_MA_#2 
Correctness: 
The properties of termination, fairness and non-repudiation are met for the reasons that (i) PX 
terminates only by receiving a message from the TTP and the contents of the TTP’s message 
alone decide the type of termination; and, (ii) the TTP in PR_MA_#1 is state-keeping (TR = ∞) 
and can therefore restore fairness whenever it is approached by an honest PX for a post-exchange 
dispute resolution. If honest users re-execute the protocol after every exceptional termination, 
non-triviality is guaranteed if there exists an execution in which the message transfer delays 
between PA, PB and the TTP do not exceed the ∆ determined by the TTP at the start of the 
exchange phase; i.e., if message transfer delays do not increase during an execution.  
4. Crash-Tolerant Fair Exchange Protocols 
4.1. Restricted Abuser and Synchronous Communication (CT_RS) 
We make PR_RS crash tolerant by incorporating three features: (i) state-keeping TTP, (ii) 
check-pointing by protocol processes, and (iii) an additional round in the exchange phase.  
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State-keeping TTP: In step 0.1, TR is set to ∞. The TTP executes steps T1 and T2 of Section 
3.1 at TEX+4∆, except that it does not respond to PX that has sent no message to it. In Step T3, it 
does not terminate but waits to respond to a message from PX. The response to PX is either an 
abort or a resolve message. (The latter is denoted as Ack2TTP(X), not as MTTP(X).) Thus, the TTP 
always helps a recovered PX to terminate. Appendix 2 presents the TTP’s code in detail. 
Pessimistic (synchronous) check-pointing: PX of an honest user logs every received message 
and check-points its state before the received message is processed. Thus, in Figure 2, an honest 
PX receives and logs the messages of the incoming channels before it sends out a message.  
Even with check-pointing by PX and state-keeping by TTP, PR_RS is not crash-tolerant. 
Consider the following scenario. Let NA crash after AckA(B) is sent but before AckB(A) is 
received (see Figure 2). PA must have logged IA, ΠA, and MB and check-pointed the sending of 
MA, prior to processing the received MB. Let dishonest UB block all messages PA sent to PB but 
retains a copy of them. PB, having received no message from PA within 2∆ time, sends ReqB for 
which the TTP will respond by setting outcome = aborted and sending AbortTTP(B). Say UB 
blocks AbortTTP(B) as well and crashes NB. Say, PA recovers meanwhile. Having received only 
MB, PA will send ResA but the TTP’s response to PA will be to send AbortTTP(A). Let UB re-boot 
NB and adjust the clock to make it appear as if ΠB has just been received. He replays the arrival 
of the blocked messages from PA exactly at those instances when they arrived during the first 
execution. Since PB ‘receives’ both MA and AckA(B), it delivers IA to UB.  
4.1.1. Outline of Protocol CT_RS – Incorporating the Third Round 
To make PR_RS crash-tolerant, we additionally need to make two provisions: (a) when PB 
has MA and AckA(B), it can deliver IA to UB without consulting the TTP only if it knows that PA 
also has MB and AckB(A); and, (b) even after the TTP has aborted the exchange for PB, it can 
resolve the exchange for PA if PA ‘appeals’ with valid credentials. A third round (shown in Figure 
4) is added to implement (a) and (b).  
PX check-points its state soon after it completes the first two rounds. Only if it has received 
both MY and AckY(X), it enters the third round by sending a second acknowledgement Ack2X(Y) 
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to PY. (Otherwise, it acts as in PR_RS.) Once PX enters the third round, it expects to receive 
Ack2Y(X) from PY within 2∆ time. If Ack2Y(X) is not received until the timeout expires, PX 
appeals to the TTP by sending First_AcksX that contains both AckX(Y) and AckY(X).  
PBPA Ack
2
A(B) PBAck
2
B(A)PA
MB MA
Round 3
Ack B(A) Ack A(B)
 
Figure 4. Additional message round for CT_RS. 
When the TTP receives First_AcksA, it sends a resolve message Ack2TTP(A) to PA only if it 
had not earlier sent AbortTTP(A) to PA. (The decision to send Ack2TTP(A) to PA is not influenced 
by whether or not AbortTTP(B) had been earlier sent to PB.) The condition for PA to terminate 
normally is: received(Ack2ZA(A)) where ZA∈{B, TTP}; that for PB is: received(Ack2ZB(B)), ZB 
∈{A, TTP}. The pseudo-code and the correctness arguments are given in Appendix A2. Table 4 
shows the three messages used in addition to those used in PR_RS. 
 
No. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 Ack2A(B)=(L, A,  H(N), 
H(AckB(A)), My_ack2); PA→ PB 
Ack2B(A)=(L, B,  H(N), 
H(AckA(B)), My_ack2); PB → PA 
2 First_AcksA = (L, A, H(N), 
AckA(B), AckB(A)); PA → TTP 
First_AcksB = (L, B, H(N), 
AckB(A), AckA(B)); PB → TTP 
3 Ack2TTP(A) = (L, TTP,  H(N),  
H(AckA(B)), My_ack2); TTP → PA 
Ack2TTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
H(AckB(A)), My_ack2); TTP → PB 
4 MTTP(A) not used MTTP(B) not used 
Table 4.  Additional Messages of CT_RS. 
4.2. Malicious Abuser, Synchronous Communication (CT_MS_#1 and CT_MS_#2) 
Protocols CT_MS_#1 and CT_MS_#2 are obtained from PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2 
respectively by adding the third round in the same manner employed for obtaining CT_RS from 
PR_RS. The contents of a few messages need to be changed and these changes arise due to the 
following reason. Recall that AckX(Y) sent in the second round (also the final round) of 
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PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2 contains keys for decrypting the messages received in the earlier 
round. These keys must now be exchanged in the third round, and the AckX(Y) is sent containing 
no keys. Also, Ack2TTP(X) will now include the key that was contained in MTTP(X) as the latter is 
not used in the crash-tolerant versions. These changes are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
No. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), 
My_ack); PA → PB               
AckB(A) = (L, B, H(N), H(MA), 
My_ack); PB → PA  
2 Ack2A(B)=(L, A,  H(N), H(AckB(A)), 
KA); PA → PB 
Ack2B(A)=(L, B, H(N), 
H(AckA(B)), KB); PB → PA 
3 First_AcksA = (L, A, H(N), AckA(B), 
AckB(A)); PA → TTP        //  as in 
CT_RS 
First_AcksB = (L, B, H(N), 
AckB(A), AckA(B)); PB → TTP   
//  as in CT_RS 
4 Ack2TTP(A) = (L, TTP,  H(N),  
H(AckA(B)), KB); TTP → PA 
Ack2TTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
H(AckB(A)), KA);  TTP → PB 
 MTTP(A) not used MTTP(B) not used 
Table 5.  Additions to and Changes in the Messages of PR_MS_#1 for deriving CT_MS_#1. 
 
No. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), 
My_ack); PA → PB               
AckB(A) = (L, B, H(N), H(MA), 
My_ack); PB → PA  
2 Ack2A(B)=(L, A,  H(N), H(AckB(A)), 
K-1A); PA → PB 
Ack2B(A)=(L, B, H(N), H(AckA(B)), 
K-1B); PB → PA 
3 First_AcksA = (L, A, H(N), AckA(B), 
AckB(A)); PA → TTP    //  as in 
CT_RS 
First_AcksB = (L, B, H(N), AckB(A), 
AckA(B)); PB → TTP    //  as in 
CT_RS 
4 Ack2TTP(A) = (L,TTP, H(N),  
H(AckA(B)), K-10B); TTP → PA 
Ack2TTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), 
H(AckB(A)), K-10A);  TTP → PB 
 MTTP(A) not used MTTP(B) not used 
Table 6.  Additions to and Changes in the Messages of PR_MS_#2 for deriving CT_MS_#2. 
4.3. Malicious and Restricted Abusers, Asynchronous Communication, on-line TTP 
(CT_RA, CT_MA_#1 and CT_MA_#2)  
These protocols are obtained by making PR_RA, PR_MA_#1 and PR_MA_#2 crash-tolerant. 
This is done by (i) having process PX pessimistically checkpoint its state before processing a 
received message, and (ii) making the TTP state-keeping. The latter is done as follows: for any 
message received from PX after TEX + 4∆, the TTP sends MTTP(X) to PX if both AckA(B) and 
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AckB(A) have been received before TEX + 4∆; otherwise it sends AbortTTP(X). Checkpointing 
permits a recovered PX to resume execution correctly and the state-keeping by the TTP allows the 
recovery time to be arbitrary.  Note that the third round is not needed because PX can terminate 
only by receiving a message from the (on-line) TTP. 
4.4. Summary and Extensions 
PR_RS is the basic protocol from which we derive every other protocol. Its TTP is offline 
and state-relinquishing. The restricted abuse assumption was relaxed in two ways: by adding 
post-exchange resolution procedures (PR_MS_#1) and by the use of compatible and inverse keys 
(PR_MS_#2). From this core sub-family of triplets, many other triplets are derived as shown in 
Figure 4, where a circle represents a protocol-triplet for both the abuse models (α = *). Note that 
the bound DR on dispute resolution delays must be known for the TTP to be state-relinquishing; 
otherwise, TR needs to be ∞, i.e., the TTP be state-keeping. (See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.)  
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Figure 5. Protocol Derivation Methods. 
The triplet PR_*S is enhanced in section 3.3 to PR_*A by making the TTP online and 
estimating ∆ freshly before each exchange initiation to ensure non-triviality. (The protocol-
triplets with on-line TTP are indicated by thick circles in Figure 5.) Retaining off-line TTP, 
PR_*S are enhanced to CT_*S in sections 4.1 and 4.2. It required adding three features: state-
keeping TTP (SK), PX to checkpoint its state (CP), and a third round (3R). In section 4.3, the 
- 25 - 
PR_*A (with online TTP) are transformed to CT_*A by adding just SK and CP. Note that adding 
3R is not needed when the TTP is on-line and solely dictates how PX should terminate. 
The dotted arrows in Figure 5 represent derivations not described in the earlier sections. 
Consider first the protocols with offline TTP (shown in the upper half of Figure 5). Deriving 
CT_*A from CT_*S is straightforward for the following reason. A recovered node resuming the 
protocol execution after an arbitrary amount of repair-time appears to its environment as a 
reliable node whose response is arbitrarily delayed. So, CT_*S will cope with network 
asynchrony so long as ∆ is estimated freshly before each exchange initiation to ensure non-
triviality. Reduction of CT_*A to PR_*A removes check-pointing (CP) since nodes do not crash. 
For protocols with online TTP, reducing CT_*A to CT_*S and PR_*A to PR_*S would mean 
that the fresh evaluation of ∆ is not necessary as the bound D on message delays is known in the 
synchronous model. Further, the bound DR can also be known. So, the post-exchange dispute 
resolution no longer requires the TTP to be state-keeping in PR_*S, since nodes do not crash.  
5. Restricting Abuse 
Our restricted abuser model requires that a dishonest user be prevented from extracting 
encryption keys (KA and KB) and from modifying verification procedure (VA or VB) which are 
embedded in the code (ΠA or ΠB) supplied by the TTP. In this section, we show that how the 
model of malicious abuser can be reduced to one of restricted abuser. We make use of the 
smartcard technology and also a smartcard-based protocol of Shoup and Rubin [SR96] designed 
for secure generation of session keys for distributed processes. The latter has been proven correct 
in [SR96, B03] and its implementation can be seen in [J_98]. (For an easy understanding of the 
protocol, we refer the reader to a deconstructed version in [B03].) Our attempt at restricting 
abuse involves a small modification on the use of the original Shoup and Rubin protocol but 
preserves the smartcard to be a stateless probabilistic device.  
Figure 6 depicts the Smartcard-based Fair-Exchange system. Each node NX is attached to a 
smartcard device to interact with the smartcard CX of user UX. We assume, as in [SR96], that CX 
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has a hardwired, long-term key K1X stored in it, and is shared only with the TTP; UX is assumed 
not to be able to guess this key stored in his own card. We also assume that the smartcard devices 
are tamper-resistant and do not crash. Finally, the communication between PX and the local 
smartcard device is assumed reliable (i.e., what is sent is received uncorrupted) and synchronous.  
The principles behind abuse restriction are two-fold. Shoup and Rubin protocol assumes the 
availability of a TTP which, upon being requested by one of the users, initiates an execution of 
the protocol. At the end of the execution, the user processes (PA and PB in our case) obtain a 
shared symmetric key (say, K) from their local smartcard CX. In our system, a dishonest user UX 
could control PX. So, CX returns to PX the K encrypted with its hard-wired long-term key K1X. 
(This is the only modification on the use of Shoup and Rubin protocol.) The shared K encrypted 
with K1X is denoted as K2X.  Note that the TTP knows K1X for X= A or B, and hence it can know 
K, given K2X. Thus, the TTP, CA and CB together form the logical TTP for PR_RS and CT_RS in 
the following sense. The TTP and CX enable PX towards using a key K that can also be used by 
PY. UX cannot deduce K since PX receives and stores K only in the encrypted form  -  encrypted 
with K1X that UX cannot access.  
NA 
TTP 
PA 
NB 
PB 
UA 
Communication 
subsystem 
CA 
UB 
CB 
Logical TTP 
Communication 
subsystem 
 
Figure 6. Smartcard Based Fair-Exchange System. 
Secondly, the supplied K is used in place of KA and KB. (See also the remark Distinct Keys in 
Section 3.1.) Since PA and PB do not know K, they cannot perform the protocol-specific 
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cryptographic operations, such as forming ΦX, by themselves. So they have such operations done 
for them by the local CX. To this end, CX supports three APIs. Moreover, to preserve CX to be a 
stateless device,  these APIs are invoked by PX with all relevant information so that CX does not 
have to store any protocol specific information (including the K it generated).  The three APIs are 
verify_local(), verify_remote(), and decrypt(). They enable PA (i) to have IA verified, (ii) to have 
MA constructed, and (iii) to verify and decrypt MB, respectively. They are described below. 
5.1. Modifications and Additional Support 
Recall that in protocols PR_RS and CT_RS, the TTP sends ΠA to PA which contains: L, 
H(N), VA, ∆, KA, and KB. In the smartcard-based system, L, H(N) and ∆ remain the same; instead 
of VA, V1A = eK1A(L, H(N), UA, VA) is sent; and, the information SRA necessary for PA to 
execute Shoup-Rubin protocol is sent in place of KA and KB. Thus, ΠA = (L, H(N), V1A, ∆, SRA) 
and ΠB = (L, H(N), V1B, ∆, SRB). PA and PB execute the protocol which results in PA receiving 
K2A from CA and PB receiving K2B from CB, if processes execute the protocol properly and do not 
prematurely timeout on each other. 
 
verify_local(): 
PA → CA: (K2A, V1A, IA); /* note: V1A = eK1A(L, H(N), UA, VA).     
 CA → PA: MA = eK(L, H(N), UA, VA, IA) if VA(IA), or nackA otherwise; 
Using its hard-wired key K1A, CA decrypts the first and the second input parameters to obtain 
K and (L, H(N), UA, VA), respectively. If the third input parameter (IA) passes VA, then CA 
constructs MA with the contents encrypted with K and returns MA. The contents of MA are those 
obtained in the decryption of the second input parameter (V1A) and the verified IA. 
 
verify_remote():  
PA → CA: (K2A, MB); 
CA → PA:  ackA = eK(L, H(N), UB, OK) if VB(IB), or nackA otherwise; 
CA obtains K from K2A; using K, it decrypts MB to (L, H(N), UB, VB, IB). If IA passes VA, CA 
returns ackA.  
If PA receives ackA, it sends AckA(B) to PB in protocol PR_RS with ackA in place of My_ack 
(see row 3, Table 1); in protocol CT_RS, AckA(B) sent will be as in Table 1 and ackA will replace 
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My_ack2 in Ack2A(B) (see row 1, Table 4).  If, on the other hand, PA receives nackA, it assumes 
that it did not receive MB and acts as per the protocol – i.e., sends ReqA to the TTP. The 
messages ResA, ReqA and First_AcksA will additionally include K2A as shown in Table 7. 
If the TTP decides to resolve the exchange after the due verification process, it computes 
ackTTP(A) for PA which is the same as ackB = eK(L, H(N), UA, OK); similarly,  and ackTTP(B)  for 
PB is the same as ackA = eK(L, H(N), UB, OK).  It uses ackTTP(X) in place of My_ack in MTTP(X) 
for PR_RS (see row 6, Table 1); for CT_RS, it uses ackTTP(X) in place of My_ack2 in Ack2TTP(X) 
(see row 3 of Table 4).  The resulting contents of MTTP(X) and Ack2TTP(X) are shown in rows 4 
and 5 of Table 7 respectively. (Recall that MTTP(X) is not used in CT_RS.) 
 
No. Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB 
1 ReqA = (L, A, H(N), MA, Abort_request, 
K2A); PA → TTP 
ReqB =  (L, B, H(N), MB, Abort_ request, 
K2B); PB → TTP 
2 ResA = (L, A, H(N), MA, MB, Resolve_ 
request, K2A); PA → TTP 
ResB = (L, B, H(N), MB, MA, Resolve_ 
request, K2B); PB → TTP 
3 First_AcksA = (L, A, H(N), AckA(B), 
AckB(A), K2A); PA → TTP  /* used only in 
CT_RS 
First_AcksB = (L, B, H(N), AckB(A), 
AckA(B), K2B); PB → TTP  /* used only in 
CT_RS 
4 MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), MB, ackTTP(A)); 
TTP  → PA   /* used only in PR_RS 
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), MA, ackTTP(B)); 
TTP  →  PB   /* used only in PR_RS 
5 Ack2TTP(A) = (L, TTP,  H(N),  
H(AckA(B)), ackTTP(A)); TTP → PA    /* 
used only in CT_RS 
Ack2TTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(AckB(A)), 
ackTTP(B));  TTP → PB    /* used only in 
CT_RS 
Table 7. Description of messages used when abuse is restricted by smartcards. 
 
decrypt():    PA → CA: (K2A, V1A, MB, ackB) or (K2A, V1A, MB, ackTTP(A));    
      CA → PA : IB; 
 
In the decrypt() operation, CA checks (i) if the first three fields {L, H(N), UA} of V1A, and of 
ackB or ackTTP(A) are identical, and (ii) if the first two fields {L, H(N)} of MB and of ackB or 
ackTTP(A) are identical. If (i) and (ii) are verified to be true, CA decrypts MB and returns IB. 
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6.  Related Work and Discussions 
To the best of our knowledge, this and [ES04] are the only papers that considered the 
restricted abuser model in solving the fair-exchange problem and also to show how smartcards 
can be used to realise that model. The smartcards and the related protocols essentially build a 
trusted computing base (TCB) within an untrustworthy host. Such an abstraction is assumed in 
[AGGV04] to solve a multi-party fair-exchange problem for the synchronous communication 
model. The smartcards are stateless probabilistic devices, and are retained so while we use them 
to realize our restricted abuse model. Vogt et. al., on the other hand, develop a 2-party fair-
exchange protocol [VPG01] using smartcards as state-keeping, trusted computing platforms. For 
example, a smartcard should be able to construct signed messages describing its state and be able 
to authenticate the signed messages it receives, say, from a Bank.  
Incorporating Crash Tolerance. The paper by Liu et. al. [LNJ00] is the first and perhaps the only 
other work we know of, to undertake the task of transforming non-fault-tolerant protocols into 
crash-tolerant ones. The authors propose a semantics-based message logging scheme which 
optimises the number of messages that need to be pessimistically (synchronously) logged. The 
proposed approach is claimed to work for both on-line and off-line TTP based protocols. 
Moreover, their approach is claimed to be orthogonal to the underlying delay model (see section 
6.2 of [LNJ00]). To substantiate these claims, the authors have considered a protocol with an on-
line and state-keeping TTP; this protocol is identical to our PR_MA_#1 except that the 
communication model is taken to be synchronous. The protocols we have developed here 
indicate that the issue of incorporating crash-tolerance is far more subtle than the claims of 
[LNJ00] and is governed by a combination of several factors. Referring to Figure 5, the following 
can be observed when a non-fault-tolerant protocol is made crash-tolerant: 
• When the TTP is on-line, it must be made state-keeping (SK) if it is not already, in addition 
to CP. This ensures that a recovering honest node can learn the outcome of an exchange 
from the TTP and terminate. Also, our protocol family shows that there can be non-fault-
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tolerant protocols with a state-relinquishing TTP; that is, there is no reason to suppose that 
a non-fault-tolerant protocol will only have a state-keeping TTP. 
• If the TTP is off-line, the protocol itself may have to be modified. In Section 4.1.1, we have 
shown that adding CP and SK alone is not sufficient for offline-TTP protocols PR_*S to be 
made crash-tolerant; 3R is also needed. 
• Whether the TTP is on-line or off-line, the delay model does matter if non-triviality is to be 
guaranteed. Asynchronous model requires the TTP to estimate ∆ freshly before an 
exchange initiation to cope with increase in message transfer delays. 
The semantics-based message logging scheme by [LNJ00] operates as follows. It defines the 
point of no return for a user process, and if the process would synchronously log all received 
messages before entering this point, then logging of other received messages can be done 
asynchronously. The structure of CT_RS however indicates that a strategy based on point of no 
return alone is not sufficient to make an off-line protocol crash-tolerant; it should involve 
process check-pointing as well. In CT_RS, PX check-points its state once it completes the first 
two rounds. (See sub-section 4.1.1 and also Appendix 2.) Check-pointing ensures that PX records 
what, if any, was not received when the first two rounds ended. This in turn ensures that the post-
recovery behaviour is consistent with the pre-crash behaviour: if an action based on the non-
arrival of an expected message has been carried out in the pre-crash execution, then the arrival of 
that message after recovery is ignored.  
There are no definitive arguments in [LNJ00] to assert that all protocols will have only a 
single point of no return. If some protocols can have multiple points at which pessimistic logging 
or check-pointing is essential, then attempts to minimise the overhead of logging may not be 
worth the effort after all, given that the number of messages received by a user process in a given 
execution is small.  
Contract-signing Protocols. The 2-round structure of PR_RS of Section 3.1 is identical to that of 
a contract-signing scheme (Scheme 2) of [PSW98]. Similarly, Scheme 3 of [PSW98] is identical 
in structure to protocol PR_RA with the off-line TTP which, as per Figure 5, can be derived from 
- 31 - 
CT_RS (of Section 4.1) by adding a fresh estimation of ∆ prior to each exchange initiation, and 
by removing check-pointing and message logging. In contract-signing, two users compute a 
contract as a non-repudiable agreement over a pre-agreed contractual text such that even if one 
user misbehaves either both or none obtain a contract. The signing process is structured so that if 
a user is deemed to misbehave after a certain point in the execution, the TTP generates that user’s 
signature [GJM99] or a valid alternative [ASW98].  Such counter-measures by the TTP are 
simplified by the fact that the contractual text is known to the users prior to the signing process, 
unlike the item IX which is a secret for UY prior to the exchange process. Because of this 
difference, contract-signing is a weaker version of the fair-exchange problem and can always be 
solved (by default) through fair-exchange of signatures.  For this reason, the impossibility results 
on contract-signing apply to fair-exchange; also, schemes 2 and 3 of [PSW98] assume malicious 
abuser, whereas PR_RS and PR_RA with the off-line TTP require that the abuser be restricted.  
These structural similarities and the reasons provided below suggest that any contract-signing 
protocol can lead to a fair-exchange protocol being derived for the restricted abuse model. In 
contract-signing, the messages that PA sends to PB (until a certain point in the execution) are 
useless to a dishonest UB, because the received message cannot by itself form a contract and the 
contractual text within it is not a secret. Similarly, with the restricted abuse assumption, the 
messages that PA receives from PB are useless to UB (though they may contain IA): they are a 
black-box to UB who cannot force PB to decrypt them against the protocol conditions. Further, 
the signatures generated by the TTP as a counter-measure in contract-signing has its equivalence 
in the TTP sending a resolve message (MTTP(X) or Ack2TTP(X)) and thereby having PX decrypt 
ΦY and deliver IY to UX.  
We believe that the rich variety of contract-signing protocols in the literature and their 
analyses (e.g. [CMSS03]) can help derive new families of fair-exchange protocols and a deeper 
understanding of them. For example, Scheme 1 of [PSW98], [GJM99] and [ASW98] present 
asymmetric protocols which assign non-identical roles to each user, whereas all the protocols in 
the family developed here are symmetric. 
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7.  Concluding Remarks 
The paper comprehensively investigated the problem of TTP-based, 2-party fair-exchange, by 
considering three significant factors that influence the solution space. The first factor is 
concerned with a dishonest user’s ability to interfere with the protocol execution. In the restricted 
abuser model, a dishonest user cannot obtain the keys embedded in the code supplied by the TTP 
and also cannot force the protocol process to operate against the protocol conditions. In the worst 
case, he can unintentionally, rather than maliciously, block or delay the messages exchanged and 
crash his node. Though the protocols for this model have the same time and message complexity 
as the others, they warrant no post-exchange dispute resolution nor require sophisticated 
cryptographic keys, such as compatible and inverse keys. We also describe a scheme by which 
the restricted abuser model can be realized through the use of smartcards and related protocols.  
The other two factors concern the ability to estimate a bound on communication delays 
between the parties and the possibility of an honest user’s node crashing in the middle of a 
protocol execution. The family of protocols illustrates the impact of various assumptions that can 
be made regarding these factors. For example, we identify that the post-exchange dispute 
resolution involving (only the TTP and the Trusted authorities) can be eliminated in one of the 
following two ways: reducing the malicious abuse model to one of restricted abuse (using code 
obfuscation or smartcard-based approach of section 5), or using sophisticated keys (as in 
PR_MS_#2). Also, it was observed that several issues must be considered while transforming a 
non-fault-tolerant protocol into a crash tolerant one; particular attention needs to be paid to the 
question of whether the TTP of the non-fault-tolerant protocol is off-line or on-line.  
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Appendix A1 
Protocol PR_RS: Restricted Abuser, Synchronous and non-fault-tolerant 
The Protocol 
In presenting the protocol, we assume the use of a primitive timed-receive(M) which blocks until either 
M is received or an associated timer expires. We use receive(M) as the conventional blocking primitive. 
Both primitives return M only if M is received with authentic signature of origin and with appropriate 
contents. The Boolean received(M) returns true if M has been obtained through one of these primitives. 
Procedure Terminate(M) is used to terminate the execution based on the contents of M: if M is an abort-
token, execution is terminated exceptionally; otherwise normal termination results. The pseudo-code 
executed by PA is given below. That for PB can be obtained by interchanging A and B. 
PA: 
begin 
/* PART 1   
{If not (VA(IA)) then exit; // IA does not pass verification, so terminate.. 
  cobegin  /* spawn two concurrent threads; thread 1: 
{ send MA to PB;  timer = 2∆;  
   timed_receive(AckB(A)); 
if received(AckB(A)) then {store(AckB(A));}  
  } 
  ⏐⏐ /* thread 2: 
  { timer = 2∆; timed_receive(MB); 
   if received(MB) then {store(MB); send AckA(B) to PB;}  
  } 
  coend; /* concurrent threads terminate; act in one of three ways 
/* PART 2  
#1  if (received(MB) and received(AckB(A)) then  // normal termination 
 {decrypt ΦB using KB; deliver IB to UA;} 
#2  else if received(MB) then  
   {send ResA to TTP; receive(M) from TTP; Terminate(M);} 
#3  else {send ReqA to TTP; receive(M) from TTP; Terminate(M);} 
 } 
end; 
Figure A1.1. The Pseudo-code given to PA. 
Observations 
State of PA {received(MB), 
received (AckB(A))} 
State of PB { received (MA), received 
(AckA(B))} 
SA(1,1) {true, true} SB(1,1) {true, true} 
SA(1,0) {true, false} SB(1,0) {true, false} 
SA(0,1) {false, true} SB(0,1) {false, true} 
SA(0,0) {false, false} SB(0,0) {false, false} 
Table A1.1. Expressing the states of PA and PB when their concurrent threads terminate. 
To make some useful observations, let us consider the state of PX at the end of part 1, i.e., when the 
concurrent threads of PX terminate in a given execution. The state of PX at this instance of time is 
expressed in terms of the (Boolean) values the variables received(MY) and received(AckY(X)) evaluate at 
that time. PX can be in one of four states identified in Table A1.1; e.g., SA(0,0) indicates the state of PA in 
which received(MB) = false = received(AckB(A)). Let us suppose that UA is honest and consider the states 
of PA and PB when they complete part 1. The following observations can be made: 
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Observation 1.  If PA is in SA(0,0), then PB can be in either SB(0, 0) or SB(1, 0). This is because PA has 
not received MB. Hence, received(AckA(B)) cannot be true and PB cannot be in SB(*, 1), where * denotes 
either 1 or 0.  
Observation 2.  If PA is in SA(0,1) then PB can only be in SB(1, 0). When PA sends ReqA to TTP, it is 
in SA(0,0) or in  SA(0,1) (see case #3 of Fig. A1.1); so, PB cannot be in SB(1, 1) and cannot execute case 
#1 of its pseudo-code, i.e., cannot terminate normally without receiving MTTP from TTP. 
Observation 3.  PA in SA(1,0) implies that PB can be in any one of the four states SB(*,*). When PA is 
in SA(1,0) it sends ResA to the TTP (see case #2 of Fig. A1.1). So, if PA sends ResA, PB could be sending 
ReqB, or sending ResB, or terminating normally without receiving MTTP. 
Observation 4.   PA in SA(1,1) means that PB cannot certainly be in SB(0,*). That is, if PA terminates 
normally without receiving MTTP, PB should not be sending ReqB to the TTP. 
Protocol for TTP 
The TTP initiates the exchange phase at its clock time TEX by sending ΠA (ΠB) which is executed by PA 
(PB). As stated earlier, ΠX is embedded with L, N, VX, ∆, and keys KA and KB. ∆ is set to D  for protocol 
PR_RS. At its clock time TEX + 4∆, the (state-relinquishing) TTP terminates after resolving or aborting 
the exchange or sending no further message if no message is received from any user process since TEX. 
Figure A1.2 presents the pseudo-code. 
TTP: 
  when (clock = TEX) do { 
send ΠA to PA; send ΠB to PB; Set_of_M M_BagL = { }; 
repeat {receive(M); deposit M in M_BagL;} until clock < TEX+ 4∆; 
 if  M_BagL ≠ { } /* either resolve or abort the exchange:  
    then { if ((received(ReqA) and (received(ReqB)) or (received(ResX): X = A or B))  
      then {send MTTP(A) to PA; send MTTP(B) to PB;} // exchange resolved 
      else if (received(ReqX): X = A or B) // abort exchange 
       then {send AbortTTP(A) to PA; send AbortTTP(B) to PB;} 
    }; 
 } /* end do 
Figure A1.2. Pseudo-code for the TTP in protocol PR_RS. 
Correctness Reasoning for Protocol Properties: 
Let us fix UA to be honest throughout our reasoning. We will assume that the instructions are executed in 
zero time. (This means that ∆ needs to be increased appropriately.) Let us suppose that PA received ΠA at 
time TA as per the the TTP’s clock; so, TA < TEX + ∆. The concurrent threads of PA set the timer to 2∆. 
So, any of PA’s messages to the TTP, must have been received by the TTP before TA + ∆ + 2∆ < TEX + 
4∆. This means that when PA sends ReqA or ResA to the TTP, it must receive a response from the TTP 
within a finite time.  
Termination: PA sets the timer for 2∆ when it expects to receive a message from PB. Hence, it does not 
wait for ever. Any message it sends to the TTP reaches the TTP before TEX + 4∆. Hence PA must 
terminate receiving a response from the TTP within a bounded amount of time. 
Suppose that PA terminates normally and delivers an item I to UA. It obtains ΦB by decrypting MB with 
KA and then I by decrypting ΦB with KB. PB forms ΦB and sends MB only if the IB (supplied by UB) 
satisfies VB which it received directly from the TTP. The VB that the TTP encloses in ΠB is identical to 
the VB that UA approved of in step 1.3 (the exchange initiation request step). Even if UB is dishonest, he 
is a restricted abuser (see definition in Section 2.1). Therefore, I =  IB and UA must find VB(I)  true, that 
is, UA must find I meeting ΣB.   
 
 
- 37 - 
Fairness:  
1. If PA terminates exceptionally, UB cannot receive IA so long as the contents of ΠB is opaque to a 
UB.  
2. If PA terminates normally, honest PB also terminates normally. 
Part 1. Suppose that PA terminates exceptionally. This means that PA cannot have sent ResA to the TTP; 
if it had, the TTP would have received that ResA before its clock time TEX + 4∆ and responded with 
MTTP(A). Therefore, PA must have sent ReqA and received an abort from the TTP. The observation 2 
indicates that PB cannot terminate normally without receiving MTTP(B) from the TTP.  The code for the 
TTP indicates that if the TTP sends abort to PA, it also sends abort to PB. Therefore, PB of honest UB 
terminates exceptionally. 
Say, UB is dishonest and PB receives MA. Since UB is a restricted abuser, he cannot make PB compute IA 
from the received MA without the protocol conditions having been satisfied, nor can he guess the keys KA 
and KB. So, UB does not receive IA even though PB receives MA. Thus, UB, honest or not, could not have 
received IA. 
Part 2. Suppose that PA terminates normally. We need to show that if UB is honest, PB also terminates 
normally. The arguments for it follow from those provided below for Non-Triviality. They show that 
when both UA and UB are honest, UA and UB are certainly delivered of the each other’s item. 
Non-Triviality: Suppose that both UA and UB are honest. Let PA and PB receive ΠA and ΠB at the TTP’s 
clock time TA and TB respectively. Since clocks of the TTP, PA and PB are assumed to be perfectly 
synchronised (assumption A2, Section 2.5), TEX ≤ TX < TEX + ∆, X ∈ {A, B}; i.e., ⏐TA – TB⏐ < ∆; 
further, TX is also the local clock time when PX begins executing the received ΠX. When PA sends MA at 
TA, MA is received at NB before TA + ∆. Since TB < TA +∆, PB must receive MA no later than TA + ∆ < TB 
+ 2∆ = TB + 2∆. PB sends AckB(A) immediately after receiving MA. So, PA must receive AckB(A) before 
TA + 2D = TA + 2∆. This means that the concurrent threads of both PA and PB will have timed-receive() 
returning the expected message. So, with the TTP being kept off-line, UA and UB are delivered of the 
other’s item. 
Non-Repudiation: If PA obtains MB from MTTP, then it has evidence of origin provided by the the TTP; 
otherwise, it has PB’s evidence of origin for MB. It also has the TTP’s evidence for KB using which it 
computes IB from MB. 
❑ 
 
 
Appendix A2 
Protocol CT_RS: Restricted Abuser, Synchronous and Crash-tolerant 
The program executed by PA has two parts. The first part is the same as for PR_RS and the second part 
contains the necessary extensions as shown in Figure A2.1. Note that PA check-points its state before 
executing Part 2 to ensure that if it completes part 1 without receiving any message from PB and then 
crashes, it will know during recovery that it had already completed part 1. This in turn eliminates the 
following behaviour of PA: it completes part 1 in SA(0,0), sends ReqA to the TTP in part 2, and crashes; 
after recovery, it re-executes part 1, receives delayed messages MB and/or AckB(A), and sends to the TTP 
in part 2 a message different to ReqA.  
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PA: 
begin {  
/* PART 1 
 /* same as in PR_RS 
/* PART 2 
 check-point state; 
if received(MB) and received(AckB(A)) then 
{ send Ack2A(B) to PB; timer = 2∆; timed_receive(Ack2B(A)); 
if received(Ack2B(A))then Terminate(Ack2B(A)) 
else {send First_AcksA to the TTP; receive(M) from the TTP; Terminate(M);} 
  } 
 else if received(MB) then  
   {send ResA to the TTP; receive(M) from the TTP; Terminate(M);} 
 else {send ReqA to the TTP; receive(M) from the TTP; Terminate(M);} 
 } end; 
Figure A2.1. Pseudo-code executed by PA in protocol CT_RS. 
Protocol for the TTP 
Figure A2.1 presents the code for (an off-line) TTP in two parts. Part 1 is similar to the TTP code for 
PR_RS (see figure A1.2) and the second part makes the TTP a state-keeping one. To this end, three 
Boolean variables resolved(L, H(N)), abortedA(L, H(N)), and abortedB(L, H(N)) are maintained. (For 
brevity, the qualifier (L, H(N)) will be omitted in subsequent descriptions.) The code shown assumes that 
the TTP responds to messages from PX until it receives a valid request from the users to initiate another 
exchange attempt (Step 1.2 of sub-section 2.5.2).  The variable active_run# (L) for exchange L is 
assumed to hold the nonce for the latest exchange attempt. 
the TTP: 
 begin { 
  // stable predicates: 
 boolean resolved(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once the exchange is resolved 
 boolean abortedA(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once abort token is given to PA 
boolean abortedB(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once abort token is given to PB 
 /* PART 1: 
when (clock = TEX) do { 
send ΠA to PA; send ΠB to PB; Set_of_M M_BagL = { }; 
repeat {receive(M); deposit M in M_BagL;} until clock < TEX+ 4∆; 
  if  M_BagL ≠ { }  
    then { if ((received(ReqA) and (received(ReqB)))  
      then {send Ack2TTP(A) to PA; send Ack2TTP(B)to PB; 
resolved(L, H(N)) = true; }  
    }; 
 } /* end do 
 /* PART 2 (making the TTP state-keeping) 
repeat  
{ receive {M}; 
 case M of 
  ReqX: 
{if (resolved(L, H(N))) then send Ack2TTP(X)to PX 
   else {send AbortTTP(X) to PX; abortedX(L, H(N)) = true;} } 
  ResX: 
{if (not abortedA(L, H(N)) and not abortedB(L, H(N)))  
 then {send Ack2TTP(X)to PX; resolved(L, H(N)) = true;}     
 else {send AbortTTP(X) to PX; abortedX(L, H(N)) = true;} } 
  First_AcksX: 
{if (abortedX(L, H(N)))  
then send AbortTTP(X) to PX; 
else send Ack2TTP(X) to PX;} 
  
endcase; } //  
  } until active_run#(L) ≠ N; 
} end; 
Figure A2.2. Pseudo-code for the TTP in protocol CT_RS. 
Note that the Boolean variables resolved, abortedA, and abortedB are stable predicates: once they become 
true, they remain true forever during an execution. Important points to note are: a distinct aborted 
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variable is maintained for each PX, it is possible for abortedX to be true while abortedY is false, and the 
TTP’s response to a First_AcksX received depends on whether abortedX is true or not. These points are 
used in correctness arguments below.  
Correctness Arguments for Protocol Properties: 
Termination: As in PR_RS, PX of an honest UX waits on a timeout whenever it awaits a message from 
PY,  a response from the TTP always arrives. Hence, it must terminate in an exchange attempt. 
Non-triviality is guaranteed when UA and UB are honest and their nodes do not crash in an exchange 
attempt. (See sub-section 2.4.) When there is no node crash, the arguments (for non-triviality) are the 
same as in PR_RS. 
Non-repudiation: The arguments for PR_RS hold here as well. 
Fairness: Let us fix UA to be honest throughout.  
Part 1. Suppose that PA terminates exceptionally. We will argue that UB, honest or not, could not have 
received IA so long as UB cannot deduce KA, KB and VB embedded in ΠB. Let us first make three 
observations:  
• PA logs every received message before it acts; so, Booleans received(MB), received(AckB(A)) and 
received(Ack2B(A)) are stable predicates despite intervening crashes of NA: once they become 
true, they remain true in a given execution; and,  
• PA check-points its state before it begins executing part 2 of its code; so, it is not possible for PA 
to send different messages (e.g., ReqA and then ResA) to the the TTP in a given execution, 
irrespective of the number of times its node may crash during that execution. 
• PA can terminate exceptionally only by receiving an abort token from the the TTP in response to 
its sending ReqA, ResA, or First_AcksA.  
Say, PA sent ReqA. This means that it is in SA(0, *) when it began part 2 of its code. This means that PB 
cannot be in SB(1,1) to be able to produce and send First_AcksB to the the TTP. When ReqA reached the 
TTP, resolved must be false; that is, the the TTP could not have earlier resolved the exchange nor will 
resolve it in response to receiving ReqB in future. Further, when the TTP sends the abort token, it sets the 
abortedA to true which is never set back to false. Therefore, the the TTP will not resolve any of PB’s ResB 
in future. So, PB cannot deliver IA to UB. 
Say, PA sent ResA. When ResA reached the the TTP, abortedB must be true, otherwise, the the TTP would 
have resolved the exchange. This means that PB had already been given an abort token, and that the the 
TTP’s response for any future First_AcksB will be an abort token as well.  
Suppose that PA sent First_AcksA. When the TTP receives First_AcksA, abortedA must already be true. 
The code of the TTP indicates that if the TTP sets abortedX to true, then it must have received ReqX or 
ResX. We have shown that PA checkpointing its state at the end of part 1 of its code forbids it from 
sending ReqA or ResA and then First_AcksA. So, if PA terminates exceptionally, it could not have sent 
First_AcksA to the TTP. 
Part 2. Suppose that PA terminates normally. Assume to the contrary that the honest UB terminates 
exceptionally. The arguments of Part 1 indicate that when an honest user (here UB) terminates 
exceptionally, the other user process (here PA) cannot terminate normally. But, by given, PA terminates 
normally. This is a contradiction. So, honest UB must also terminate normally. 
❑ 
 
